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A Panic-Prone Pack?
The Behavior of Emerging Market Mutual Funds 
EDUARDO BORENSZTEIN and R. GASTON GELOS*
This article explores the behavior of emerging market mutual funds using a novel
database covering the holdings of individual funds over the period January 1996
to December 2000. The degree of herding among funds is statistically significant,
but moderate. Herding is more widespread among open-ended funds than among
closed-end funds, but not more prevalent during crises than during tranquil times.
We find some evidence that funds tend to follow momentum strategies, selling past
losers and buying past winners. [JEL F21, G15]
E
pisodes of high volatility in international capital flows and currency crises in
the 1990s have put international investors in the limelight. Frequently, inter-
national investors are seen as the culprits of the bouts of instability and crises,1 and
casual observation does suggest the presence of episodes of panic and contagion.
Yet the fundamental question remains as to whether there is a tendency for certain
market participants to disregard fundamental economic conditions in emerging
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1See, for example, Aitken (1998).markets, responding only to what other investors are doing or are expected to do.
The presence of such herding behavior could, to the extent it dominates interna-
tional capital flows, help to explain the seemingly excessive observed volatility
and have important policy implications. 
Assessing the behavior of international investors in a systematic way, however,
poses big challenges. Most of the available financial information consists of data
on prices. It is nearly hopeless to attempt to control for all “fundamental” news that
leads to changes in asset prices, making it impossible to convincingly establish that
a specific change in asset prices was due to herding behavior by certain groups of
investors. Moreover, herding behavior by international investors may have adverse
consequences for countries even in the absence of a large impact on prices.
For these reasons, researchers have begun to examine investor behavior in
emerging markets directly using data on investors’ portfolios and transactions.
Such data are scarce, however, and the evidence presented so far for emerging
markets is limited. The most comprehensive dataset used so far is probably the
daily data from State Street Bank and Trust examined by Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (2001). The authors find evidence for persistence and trend following in
portfolio flows. In addition, their data indicate that inflows have forecasting power
for future returns in emerging markets, but not mature markets. While their dataset
is very detailed on transactions, it does not allow the researcher to differentiate
between different classes of investors. Other studies have had a regional or country-
specific focus. 
This article contributes to this literature by exploring a novel dataset that cov-
ers more than 400 dedicated emerging market equity funds on a monthly basis
over the period January 1996–December 2000; it is the first study to document the
behavior of mutual funds on a global scale. While the period is relatively short, it
encompasses the Asian, Czech, Russian, and Brazilian crises. The aim of the study
is to provide some tentative answers to the following questions. Is there evidence
of herding among these funds during tranquil and during turbulent times? Are
there meaningful differences in the behavior of different types of fund? Do funds
systematically buy past winners and sell past losers?2
Note that it makes sense to search for evidence of herding only within a sub-
set of investors, since the whole market cannot move in the same direction (since
for every seller, there must be a buyer). In this regard, our database has the advan-
tage of covering a well-specified subclass of investors for which it is meaningful
and interesting to pose these questions. By examining a specific and important
group of market players, we can contribute more broadly to a better understand-
ing of the supply of capital to emerging markets. Although we hope our findings
will add a piece to the overall puzzle, our results should probably not be seen as
characterizing the behavior of all international investors.
We find that the degree of herding among dedicated emerging market funds is
significantly different from zero, but lower than one might have expected. Herding
is less pronounced among closed-end funds, suggesting that herding behavior
might, to a significant extent, be traceable to the behavior of individual investors
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2We do not examine the impact of funds’ behavior on their performance here.rather than fund managers. There is some evidence that emerging market funds
follow momentum strategies and do this more when selling than when buying. 
I. Herding, Momentum Trading, and Institutional Investors
The tendency of some market participants to buy or sell assets simply because they
observe other investors doing so has been labeled herding. Rationalizations of
herding include informational learning (cascades), principal-agent problems, or
other externalities.3 Informational cascades occur when actions are observable but
information is partly private. In such situations, agents’ actions provide valuable
information to others, and in some cases it may be optimal for investors to rely
exclusively on observation of the actions of others when making investment deci-
sions. This is particularly relevant if there are fixed costs of acquiring information
about a company or, in the case of interest in this study, a country.4 Herding that
results from informational cascades constitutes a case for more “transparency”—
that is, for governments and international institutions to provide markets with
more and more timely information.5
On the one hand, since institutional investors are better informed about each
other’s trades than individual investors are, it is sometimes argued that the former
are more prone to herding than the latter.6 An example of a principal-agent expla-
nation of herd behavior, on the other hand, is given by the possibility that fund
managers are evaluated based on relative, instead of absolute, performance, which
provides them with an incentive to mimic the actions of other managers.7
A related behavior of investors is the use of “momentum strategies.” In the
finance literature, it has been documented that domestic U.S. mutual funds engage
in “positive feedback trading,”8 buying assets whose prices have been rising and
selling assets whose prices have been falling. This behavior can be the result of
extrapolative price expectations, collateral or margin calls, or dynamic hedging
strategies.9
Lastly, international investors may appear to behave like a herd if they react
simultaneously to the same fundamentals. In this case, their behavior speeds up
the adjustment of prices and is not destabilizing.10 In an efficient market, however,
speedy price adjustment should occur without many actual trades having to take
place. Moreover, the question remains why international investors react differently
to information than domestic investors.
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3See Devenow and Welch (1996) for an overview of rational herding models and Bikhchandani and
Sharma (2001) for a more recent survey of the theoretical and empirical literature.
4For an example, see Calvo and Mendoza (2000).
5See Eichengreen and others (1998), p. 23.
6See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992).
7See Scharfstein and Stein (1990) or Calvo and Mendoza (2000).
8See DeLong and others (1990).
9See Eichengreen and others (1998) and Kim and Wei (2002b). Professional investment managers
occasionally recommend this strategy to their clients. For example, the Los Angeles Times quotes
Templeton Developing Markets manager Mark Mobius as suggesting, with respect to holdings of emerg-
ing market funds, that “You say, ‘If the fund goes down this much, I’m out.’” See Lim (1999).
10See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992).The empirical literature directly examining the behavior of international
investors is still sparse. Apart from Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), a few
researchers have looked at specific regions and time frames. Kim and Wei (2002a)
examine the transactions of different types of portfolio investors in Korea before
and during the Asian crisis, finding that nonresident institutional investors were
always positive-feedback traders while resident investors were contrarian traders
before the crisis but became positive-feedback traders during the crisis. Herding
appears to be more widespread among individual and nonresident investors than
among institutional and resident investors. In another study, Kim and Wei (2002b)
compare trading behavior in Korea of offshore investment funds with that of funds
registered in the United States and the United Kingdom, finding herding behavior
less prevalent among offshore funds. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998) also study trans-
action data from the Korean stock market during the crisis and find evidence for
return-chasing and herding among foreign investors before the crisis, but no evi-
dence for a destabilizing effect of foreign investors over the entire sample period.
While their data are of high frequency, they are not able to trace trades originating
from the same investor.11 Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) investigate trad-
ing strategies for 13 U.S. funds investing in Latin America, reporting evidence on
momentum strategies. The present article examines these issues on a global scale.
II. Data
The data used in this study are from a comprehensive database purchased from
eMergingPortfolio.com (formerly Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc). They
cover, on a monthly basis, the geographic asset allocation of hundreds of equity
funds with a focus on emerging markets for the period 1996:1–2000:12.
According to the provider, the database covers about 80 percent of dedicated
emerging market equity funds worldwide, with a coverage of roughly 90 percent
in terms of assets.12 Moreover, the sample is particularly interesting, given the
number of emerging market crises that occurred over the period. 
At the beginning of the sample, the database includes 382 funds managing
assets totaling $116.5 billion; at the end of the period, the number of funds
included is 642, managing $120.0 billion of assets. Note that although the total
number of funds increased over the period, some funds were dropped from the
database, mostly because they were merged or liquidated. According to the data
vendor, the exiting funds did not share specific characteristics that would result in
a serious bias of the sample. For critical calculations, however, we will provide
results for both a balanced subsample and for the whole database. There are 231
funds that stay in the sample throughout the period.
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11A few studies have investigated the herding and momentum trading behavior of U.S. mutual and
pension funds. See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992); Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995); and
Wermers (1999). Another study of herding in international, but not emerging, financial markets is Kodres
and Pritsker (1996), which analyzes daily position data of large institutional futures market participants.
12To our knowledge, the frequency of these data is higher than the data frequency of all other studies
of herding covering more than one emerging market and higher than all but one study of herding behav-
ior in the United States, for which quarterly or biannual data were used.Slightly more than half of the funds covered are international, global emerg-
ing market, or regional funds, with the rest being single-country funds (mainly for
Asian countries). In February, 1999, the sample consisted of 9 international funds
(not necessarily focusing on emerging markets), 53 global emerging market funds,
125 Asian regional funds (18 of which included equity holdings in Japan), 170
Asian single-country funds, 13 Latin American single-country funds, 52 regional
Latin American funds, and 51 funds focusing on other geographic areas (12 of
which were single-country funds). Approximately one-quarter of the funds are
closed-end funds. The funds are domiciled mostly in advanced economies and off-
shore banking centers.
Table 1 provides an overview of the types and number of funds and their hold-
ings in different geographic regions. The first interesting observation is that
although the total holdings of these mutual funds increased in Latin America,
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, their holdings in Asia decreased. An exami-
nation of the time series shows that, not surprisingly, the major drop in the value
of the Asian assets occurred during the Asian crisis of 1997. Nevertheless, after the
crisis, total holdings in Asia were still more than twice as large as those in Latin
America and significantly exceeded those in emerging Europe. Asia remains the
region with by far the largest number of single-country funds.
How important are these funds as investors in emerging equity markets?
Reliable and comprehensive statistics on foreign equity holdings in, and flows to,
emerging markets are hard to come by. Some evidence, however, indicates that the
assets of these funds represent a modest, but not insignificant fraction of the total
market capitalization. For example, for Argentina, the funds held approximately
6.5 percent of the total stock market capitalization in August 1998, while the cor-
responding share was around 4.5 percent in both Hungary and Korea. Table 2 pro-
vides a comparison of total monthly value traded, fund holdings, and market
capitalization by region. The funds in our database seem to be more important
players in emerging Europe and Latin America than in the Middle East and Africa
region and Asia. Another way of ascertaining the importance of these funds is to
compare their flows with total equity flows to emerging markets. Here, the World
Bank (2001) estimates that total equity flows to developing countries were
$15.6 billion in 1998, compared with a $1.8 billion net inflow from the funds in
our sample. For 1999, total flows were estimated at $34.5 billion, compared with
a net outflow of $1.3 billion from the funds in our sample.
One limitation of the dataset is that it provides asset positions in each country,
although we are mainly interested in the flows to individual countries. We calcu-
late implied flows from the asset-position data under some assumptions concern-
ing the stock valuation changes. In particular, we assume that funds hold a
portfolio of stocks that is well approximated by the International Finance
Corporation’s U.S. dollar total return investable index.13 We  assume that flows
A PANIC-PRONE PACK? THE BEHAVIOR OF EMERGING MARKET MUTUAL FUNDS
47
13In cases for which the IFC does not compute an investable index, we used the global index. For
countries not covered by the IFC, we employed Morgan Stanley Capital International’s U.S. dollar index
data or national indices converted into U.S. dollars. (We also redid the main calculations using MSCI data








































Table 1. Total Holdings and Number of Funds, by Region
(holdings in billion U.S. dollars)
Asia Latin America Emerging Europe Middle East and Africa 
————————— ————————— ————————— ——————————
Type of Fund Number Holdings Number Holdings Number Holdings Number Holdings
Single-country
January 1996 166 14.8 10 1.9 9 0.4 3 0.3
December 2000 162 7.3 14 1.9 12 0.3 4 0.3
Regional
January 1996 118 30.9 30 4.3 7 0.5 3 0.2
December 2000 188 19.4 78 5.9 63 2.9 18 0.2
Global emerging markets
January 1996 38* 9.0 37* 6.3 36* 2.3 37* 1.1
December 2000 115* 15.0 113* 11.4 114* 5.1 115* 4.7
International
January 1996 9* 8.0 9* 2.2 9* 13.8** 6* 0.2
December 2000 9* 9.2 19* 1.9 20* 15.0** 4* 0.1
Total
January 1996 331 62.7 86 14.7 61 17.0 49 1.8
December 2000 474 50.9 224 21.1 209 23.3 141 5.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com. 
Note: Holdings are as of the end of the month. An asterisk (*) indicates that the number provided includes all global emerging markets or international funds with
assets in the respective region. Two asterisks (**) indicate that the holdings are comprised mostly of assets in mature European markets. (International funds are the
only class of funds in the sample with substantial holdings in mature markets.)occur halfway through the period. For each country c and fund i in month t, we
therefore calculate the flow in the following way:
Flowcit = [Assetsi,c,t –A ssetsi,c,t–1 –Index returnct·Assetsi,c,t–1] /(1+Index returnct)1/2 (1)
This obviously represents an approximation, and, in certain cases, we might
be introducing nonnegligible errors by using this procedure. If individual fund
managers were able to beat the index, we would overstate the flow of funds into a
country. Consistency checks for closed-end funds, however, show that our approx-
imation is quite close.14 Moreover, for most of the statistics discussed later in this
article, the sign of the change in the position is essentially what matters. It is
unlikely that this method alters the sign of a fund’s transaction, in which case we
would erroneously classify net buyers as net sellers or vice versa. Nevertheless, we
conduct a variety of robustness checks in the following sections.
One first way of examining whether all funds move together is to look at gross
flows into and out of regions. Figure 1 displays flows into the four major geograph-
ical regions for the whole period, with net flows broken down into gross positive and
negative flows. In order to eliminate effects arising from the addition or deletion of
funds from the sample, we focus on the much smaller balanced subsample. 
The graphs and panels of Figure 1 indicate that, except for the case of the
Middle East and Africa, inflows contemporaneously coexist with outflows of sim-
ilar magnitude.15 On the one hand, this indicates that not all funds systematically
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Table 2. Market Capitalization,Value Traded,
and Total Assets of Funds for 1996–2000, by Region
(average per month, in billion U.S. dollars)
Emerging Middle  East 
Latin America Asia Europe and Africa
Market capitalization 505 1,851 274 336
Holdings 21 59 32 4
Monthly value traded 16 214 18 7
Sources: For market capitalization and turnover: International Finance Corporation; for holdings:
eMerging.Portfolio.com.
14A look at the closed-end funds in our sample allows us to ascertain the extent to which this approx-
imation is a good one. (This comparison is not possible with open-ended funds, since they are subject to
redemptions, for which we do not have data.) For these funds, the change in total assets At–At–1 should
be equal to the return on all country holdings Ai,t–Ai,t–1=∑ Index returnc,t·Total assetsi,c,t–1.W ithout tak-
ing into account returns on fixed income, the correlation between imputed and actual changes in total
assets is 0.93. Even for single-country funds, which can be expected to specialize in stock picking and
therefore to deviate significantly from the index in their returns, the correlation is 0.87. Note that for
closed-end, single-country funds, we can, ignoring timing issues, directly infer the flows into and out of
the respective country from changes in the cash position.
15The large outflows from the Middle East and Africa in November 2000 reflect sharp outflows from
Israel and South Africa.move as a herd. On the other hand, they also suggest that, measured on a net basis,
funds did pull out of markets just before major crises. For Asia, we observe siz-
able net outflows starting one month before the collapse of the Thai baht in early
July 1997 and ending in November of that year. For Europe, there is a substantial
drop in net inflows at the outset of the Russian crisis in July 1998 and lasting until
the following November. For Latin America, the figures show a sharp outflow one
month before the Brazilian devaluation in December of 1998. 
III. Testing for Herding
In this section, we compute and discuss a quantitative measure for the degree of
herding among funds. This measure, originally introduced by Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), allows an assessment of whether funds move in the
same direction more often than one would expect if they traded independently and
randomly. The indicator, denoted by HM (for herding measure), is given by 
HMit = |pit–E[pit]| – E|pit–E[pit]|, (2)
where pit is the proportion of all funds active in country i in month t that are buy-
ers, and E[pit] is its expected value. E[pit] may vary over time, and we approxi-
mate it by the total number of net buyers across all countries, divided by the total
number of funds active in that month. Since the distribution of the absolute value
of the first expression is not centered around zero, we need to subtract its expected
value. Under the null hypothesis of no herding, this expected value is calculated
assuming that the number of buyers follows a binomial distribution.
Again, as discussed previously, if news is not incorporated quickly into prices,
high HM values may indicate that funds are reacting to the same fundamentals.
This does not render the measure less interesting, since it is not clear why this
class of investors should systematically react to news in the same way (as opposed
to the type of investors on the other side of the trades). 
In order to restrict our attention to a meaningful notion of a “herd,” we calcu-
late the herding measure for only those cases in which the number of active funds
in country i at time t, Nit exceeds five. Moreover, in order to limit the impact of
errors introduced by our calculation of flows, we classify a fund as buyer or seller
only if the absolute value of the calculated flow into (or out of) a country is larger
than 3 percent of the fund’s assets in that country.16 HMitcan be calculated for dif-
ferent subgroups of funds, groups of countries, and time periods. Note that our
data do not allow us to differentiate directly between herding by managers and by
individual investors; we are, however, able to obtain some indirect evidence on the
issue, which will be discussed later in this article.
The results indicate the presence of significant, but not dramatic herding
behavior. Table 3 reports average values for HM for the four major regions and
three subperiods. The overall mean is 7.7 percent. In other words, for a given coun-
try, the number of funds moving in the same direction was approximately 8 percent
larger than one would have expected if they acted independently and randomly.
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Figure 1. Gross and Net Flows, by Region 
(balanced subpanel; figures in millions of U.S. dollars )
        Sources: Authors' calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance 
Corporation. 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1. Gross and Net Flows, by Region
(balanced subpanel; figures in millions of U.S. dollars)
Sources:Authors’calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance
Corporation.This number is more than twice as large as the values found by Wermers (1999)
and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) for U.S. institutional investors.
Interestingly, the value is very similar to the one reported by Kim and Wei (2002a)
for nonresident institutional investors investing in Korea around the time of the
Korean crisis. It is not, however, as large a figure as conventional wisdom might
have led one to expect. There is little variation in this average across regions and
over time. The numbers for Europe are initially lower but increase over time. 
We also looked more specifically at the results around crisis episodes, without
finding evidence for higher herding: as shown in Table 4, the herding measure
across countries during crisis months was 7.5 percent.17 Nevertheless, specific
months following large outflows that were documented earlier are characterized
by large herding measures (for example, the herding measure for Brazil one month
prior to the country’s crisis is 15 percent). What we do not observe is that herding
increases systematically across countries during crises. It is worth stressing again
that since we are focusing on dedicated emerging market funds, we cannot say
much about herding into and out of the emerging market asset class as a whole.
This is true despite the fact that even dedicated funds can temporarily avoid hold-
ing assets in most emerging markets by switching to cash holdings.
There might be important differences across different types of fund. For
example, the inclusion of single-country funds may tend to lower the overall
Eduardo Borensztein and R.Gaston Gelos
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Table 3. Mean Herding Measures, by Region
(in percent) 
Latin Emerging Middle  East 
All Asia America Europe and Africa
1996 7.1 6.9 7.2 5.7 9.3
(0.6) (0.8) (1.1) (1.4) (1.7)
1997 6.9 7.0 4.6 5.8 10.1
(0.6) (0.8) (1.0) (1.2) (2.0)
1998 7.8 7.6 8.4 7.4 6.6
(0.6) (0.8) (1.2) (1.2) (1.9)
1999 7.7 8.2 8.4 5.7 7.4
(0.5) (0.8) (1.1) (1.1) (1.7)
2000 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.9 10.1
(0.5) (0.8) (1.1) (1.1) (1.6)
Whole period 7.7 7.9 7.4 6.8 8.9
(0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International
Finance Corporation.
Notes: The standard error of the mean is given in parentheses. All results are significant at the
1 percent level.
17Periods include 1997:08–1997:12, 1998:06–1998:10, and 1998:11–1999:02, which correspond to
crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.herding measure if these funds are required to hold a specific fraction of their
assets in a particular country or if they are limited in their ability to hold cash
instead. Similarly, offshore investment funds may display different investment
patterns owing to lower regulatory constraints and different tax treatments they
face. Closed-end funds are not subject to redemptions and are therefore less
likely to move as a herd.18 Table 5 shows the herding measures for different
types of fund.19
The results show that excluding single-country funds does not alter the result.
In line with the results of Kim and Wei (2002b), offshore funds tend to herd less
than other funds. Confirming our expectations, there is also less herding among
smaller funds.20 Large, global, and international funds do not differ significantly
from the average in their herding behavior. In line with our a priori reasoning, herd-
ing is also less pronounced among closed-end funds (which are not subject to
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Table 4. Mean Herding Measure During Crises, by Region
(in percent) 
All Asia Latin America Europe Middle East and Africa
7.5 8.6 6.9 6.7 7.3
(0.5) (0.7) (1.0) (1.0) (1.6)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International
Finance Corporation.
Note: Crisis periods include 1997:08–1997:12, 1998:06–1998:10, and 1998:11–1999:02, which
correspond to crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.
Table 5. Mean Herding Measures, by Type of Fund
(based on average size of all funds over time)
International 
and Global Non-
Smallest Largest Closed- Emerging Single-
20 Percent 20 Percent End Markets Country Offshore
Whole period 4.6 7.0 5.9 7.4 7.7 6.2
(0.4) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) (0.3)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International
Finance Corporation.
Notes: Standard error of the mean is given in parentheses. All results are significant at the 1 per-
cent level.
18See Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) for an attempt to distinguish between herding by man-
agers and by individual investors.
19Offshore funds are defined as those having their domiciles in tax havens. An alternative definition
would have classified funds as “offshore” if they did not invest primarily in the country in which they were
located. However, a few funds do focus on the stock market of the country in which they are domiciled.
(Korean funds are among these.) Excluding those “onshore” funds did not affect the main results. The
results for different types of fund were calculated using E[pit] from the whole sample. 
20Note, however, that the smaller figure for small funds may reflect the fact that these funds experi-
enced a lower-than-average growth of inflows. redemptions), suggesting that the observed tendency for herding might, to a signif-
icant extent, be traceable to the behavior of individual investors.21 To some extent,
this contradicts the presumption, mentioned earlier, that institutional investors are
more likely to herd since they can observe each other’s actions more easily.
There might be sizable differences in the degree of herding, depending on
market size. For smaller markets, it may be more difficult, or at least relatively
more costly, to obtain accurate information about fundamentals. On the one hand,
if that is true, fund managers may be more inclined to imitate the behavior of man-
agers of other funds.22 On the other hand, when their funds are subject to large
inflows or outflows, managers may go first to the most liquid markets and then,
gradually, to the less liquid ones. Table 6 displays the herding measures for the
smallest and largest as well as for the 10 least and most liquid stock markets that
are covered by the International Finance Corporation (IFC).23 There is more herd-
ing for the largest stock markets than for the smallest, and the difference is statis-
tically significant at the 1 percent level. The difference between highly liquid and
less liquid markets, however, is not statistically significant. 
Simulating the Herding Measure Distribution
In order to gain a better grasp of the quantitative importance of our results, we fol-
low Wermers (1999) in comparing the distributions of the actual monthly herding
measures to a simulated distribution obtained under the assumption that funds
make their buying decisions independently.24 The distributions differ sharply: in
contrast to the actual distribution, the simulated distribution is nearly symmetric
Eduardo Borensztein and R.Gaston Gelos
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Table 6. Mean Herding Measures, by Stock Market Capitalization 
and by Liquidity
TenT en Ten Least  Ten Most 
Smallest Largest Liquid Liquid
Whole period 5.3 8.1 7.2 7.7
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5)
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International
Finance Corporation.
Notes: Standard errors of the means are given in parentheses. All results are significant at the
1 percent level. Liquidity is measured as value traded divided by market capitalization.
21This, of course, raises questions regarding the incentives for individual investors to herd; such
incentives would appear to be more difficult to explain than those at the fund manager level.
22See Banerjee (1992) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) for models illustrating similar arguments.
23These calculations provide the means of herding measures across the respective countries and over
time and are based on all funds in the sample that are active in those countries. Concerning the selection
of the smallest markets, although there are even smaller ones in our sample, comparability of market cap-
italization figures and, more importantly, the often very small number of transactions in such markets led
us to focus on the stock markets covered by the IFC in making this comparison. Liquidity is measured as
monthly trading volume divided by market capitalization.
24Details of the Monte Carlo simulation are given in the appendix.around zero and the moments differ significantly (Figure 2). The simulated distri-
bution also confirms that the previously obtained results are significantly different
from what would be expected under the null hypothesis of independent and ran-
dom trading.25
Alternative Specifications and Robustness
We undertook several exercises to ascertain the robustness of our results. First, one
could argue that despite controlling for time-varying propensities to buy, the herd-
ing measure might overstate the extent of actual herding if there are many funds
entering our sample, since these funds will naturally tend to grow and therefore buy
frequently. We therefore carried out the calculations with a balanced subsample—
that is, only with funds that stayed within the sample throughout the 60 months—
obtaining very similar, albeit somewhat lower, results. (The overall mean herding
measure was 7.1 percent; the region with the lowest herding overall measure was,
again, Europe, with 6.0 percent, and the one with the highest was Asia, with 7.9
percent). During crises, herding was slightly lower (with a mean of 6.9 percent).
Second, the relevant unit for our analysis may not be the individual fund, but
the firm, since many funds within one firm may be managed by the same fund
manager. We therefore also calculated the herding measure aggregating all funds
that belong to the same firm. This would be appropriate in the extreme case in
which there were only one fund manager managing all the mutual funds of a firm.
After aggregation, we are left with an average of only 84 funds per month. The
mean herding measure obtained in this way is somewhat lower, at 5.3 percent. The
lowest value was obtained for the Middle East and Africa (3.9 percent) and the
highest for Asia (6.5 percent).
Third, to address the question of measurement errors in our flows, we calcu-
lated the herding measures counting only those flows that exceeded 1 or 5 (instead
of 3) percent of the fund’s assets in the last period measured. The results were
barely altered: for example, when there was 5 percent error margin, the overall
herding measure became 7.4 percent. 
Fourth, in contrast to herding at the country level, herding might be greater at
the regional level; for example, at a particular time, everybody might want to move
into Latin America, but not necessarily into the same country markets. We inves-
tigated this possibility by treating whole regions as individual assets and focusing
on global or international funds, finding weaker evidence for herding: the overall
mean was 4.3 percent, with the average herding measure being highest for Latin
America (4.8) and lowest for the Middle East and Africa (3.1).26 Again, during
crises, the mean is lower, at 2.4 percent. 
Last, we redid the calculations using only those country-months in which the
number of funds active in the country in question, Nit,e xceeded 15 (instead of 5),
obtaining very similar results: the mean of HM was 7.8 percent.
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25For example, the ninety-fifth percentile of the mean of the empirical distribution is 6.9 percent.
26See Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) for an analogous exercise using industries instead of






























Sources:Authors’calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance
Corporation.
Notes: For actual distribution (h), number of observations = 1,882; mean = 0.0770; median = 0.0581;
standard deviation = 0.1082; and kurtosis = 3.040. For simulated distribution (hms), number of observa-
tions = 188,200; mean = 0.0037; median = –0.0074; standard deviation = 0.0642; and kurtosis = 8.209. 
Figure 2. Actual and Simulated Herding Measure DistributionsHerding and Volatility
What is the impact of herding on stock return behavior? If the amount of herding
that we detected among our group of investors had important effects on stock mar-
kets, we would expect to observe a positive correlation between the degree of
herding and stock return volatility. In order to investigate this issue, we regressed
the variance of stock-index returns (computed for each country over the whole
period) on the country mean of the computed herding measures. The result from
an ordinary-least-squares regression using 40 countries reveals a statistically sig-
nificant relationship between the two variables. The coefficient on the mean herd-
ing variable is 0.47, with a t-statistic of 14.6 and an R2 of 0.10. While this suggests
that herding affects volatility, the results should not be accepted without qualifi-
cation, given that we did not control for other factors. Moreover, reverse causality
might be present.27
A more appropriate technique than the simple regression might be a GARCH
framework. We estimated a GARCH (1,1) model in which the monthly herding
measure entered the variance equation for each country individually and found
mixed evidence for the link between herding and volatility. For the 39 countries
with sufficient observations, the herding variable entered significantly positively
(at the 5 percent level) in 15 cases, with an average coefficient of 0.04 and an aver-
age t-statistic of 3.44. In 5 cases, by contrast, the coefficient was significantly neg-
ative, with an average coefficient of –0.04 and an average t-statistic of –3.06. In
the remaining cases, the coefficient on the herding variable was not statistically
significant. 
Overall, the evidence on the relationship between herding and volatility is
mixed. Possibly, the degree of herding observed in our sample is too low to affect
volatility in a systematic, significant way.
IV. Testing for Positive-Feedback Trading
Another way of looking at these funds’ investment strategies is to examine the
extent to which they follow “positive-feedback” or “momentum” strategies. For
this purpose, we first examine whether the degree of herding can be related to past
returns. If funds follow momentum strategies, we should observe herding to be
more pronounced for extreme prior-month returns.28 We also compute two mea-
sures of excess demand proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and
examine their correlation with prior returns. The first measure, defined in their
article as the numbers ratio (NR), is given for every given month t and country i
by the total number of buyers, divided by the total number of funds active in that
country:
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27We also attempted to relate the level of stock market returns to herding. Regressions of returns on
contemporaneous and lagged herding measures did not show a significant relationship, and mean returns
are not significantly higher or lower in those country-months with exceptionally high (in the top 20 per-
cent) lagged or contemporaneous herding measures.
28See Wermers (1999).NR(i,t) = #buyers(i,t)/#active(i,t). (3)
The second measure, called the dollar ratio (DR), is the difference between
inflows and outflows, divided by the sum of inflows and outflows to a country:
DR = (inflows(i,t)–outflows(i,t))/(inflows(i,t)+outflows(i,t)). (4)
We  compute the correlations of both NR and DR with past-month returns.
Following the literature, we also present the averages of NR and DR for different
centiles of past-months’returns. More specifically, we sort all country-months into
five  prior-month-return quintiles, with lagged returns ranging from the lowest
20 percent to the highest 20 percent. For each of these quintiles, we present cor-
responding means of NR and DR. This exposition is also useful if there are non-
linearities in the relationship between the excess-demand measures and prior
returns—for example, NR and DR may differ from their overall mean only for
periods of very pronounced overperformance or underperformance. Note that, in
principle, DR and NR can yield opposite results; in any given period, the majority
of funds may be sellers, but a few large buyers may dominate the overall picture. 
The results are mixed. There is only a small overall correlation between the
herding measures and past-month returns, namely 0.05 (Table 7). The correlation
is statistically significant, however, and herding is significantly more pronounced
for the lowest and highest past-month-return quintiles than for average prior-
month returns. Similarly, the correlation between the country’s prior stock perfor-
mance and the subsequent proportion of funds (NR) buying in that market is
statistically significant, but small (6 percent). NR increases from 0.48 for the low-
est past-month-return quintile to 0.53 for the highest past-month-return quintile.
Interestingly, momentum trading seems most pronounced in the most liquid mar-
kets, while the relationship between excess demand and past returns is not statis-
tically significant for the less liquid ones. There does not seem to be more
momentum trading during crises: while the NR measures increase monotonically
by past-month-return quintile during crises, the correlation between the two vari-
ables during crises is the same as the one for the whole period (0.05) and, given
the smaller number of observations, is not statistically significant. Momentum
trading is less pronounced among the smallest and largest funds. 
The picture obtained from examining the relationship between the imbalance
measured in dollars (by DR) and lagged returns is similar (Table 8). There is a
small but statistically significant relationship between lagged returns and DR,
which is less pronounced during crises. In the case of DR,h o w e v e r ,w e   do not find
more accentuated momentum trading behavior for the most liquid markets. 
A different methodology to assess the importance of momentum strategies has
been proposed by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995). Their momentum mea-
sure is given by















































































Table 7. Past-Month Performance, Herding Measures, and Numbers Ratio (NR), by Fund Type and Market Size
Numbers Ratios
——————————————————————————————————————————————
Past-Month- Herding Large funds Small funds
Performance Measure Single-country (largest (smallest  Ten most  Ten least  All funds 
Quintile (HM)1 All funds funds 20 percent) 20 percent) liquid markets liquid markets during crises
1 (Worst) 8.0
(0.5) 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.45
2 7.0
(0.5) 0.49 0.42 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.46 0.47
3 7.0
(0.5) 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.48
4 7.7
(0.6) 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.47 0.49
5 (Best) 8.8
(0.6) 0.53 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.50
Overall 
correlation 0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.04 0.03 0.14* 0.03 0.05
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance Corporation.
Notes: Crisis periods include 1997:08–1997:12, 1998:06–1998:10, and 1998:11–1999:02, which correspond to crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.
Correlations marked with an asterisk (*) are significant at the 5 percent level.
1The numbers in parentheses in this column are standard errors.where wj,t and Rj,t denote portfolio weights and returns of country j at time t. This
is a momentum measure based on changes in portfolio weights in reaction to
returns in the previous period. It is positive if there is momentum trading. 
Compared with NR and DR, this measure has advantages and drawbacks. On the
one hand, it focuses on strategies pursued by managers rather than individual
investors, since a withdrawal by individual investors would not, per se, result in a
change of weights. On the other hand, it also captures “passive” momentum strate-
gies, since portfolio weights might change as a result of price movements without
any trades taking place—but allowing such shifts in weights is done consciously by
decision of the portfolio manager and is therefore of interest in this context. To com-
plement the results from DR and NR, we therefore follow Grinblatt, Titman, and
Wermers (1995) in documenting correlations between past returns and changes in
weights. We adopt a slightly different (and, in our view, more intuitive) approach,
however, by reporting the coefficients of regressions from (wjt–wjt–1) on Ri,t–1.
According to these regressions, momentum strategies are more prevalent on
the sell side than on the buy side (Table 9). In most cases, the coefficients on past
returns are much higher for cases in which portfolio weights decreased compared
with those in which weights increased. Similarly, as was found using the NR mea-
sure, momentum trading is more pronounced in more liquid markets; in fact, the
coefficient for the less liquid markets is negative, indicating that funds tended to
buy past losers and sell past winners.29 Similarly, as found before, large funds
seem less prone to engage in momentum trading, while, in contrast to the results
discussed previously, momentum trading seems more prevalent among the small-
est funds. Interestingly, during crises, the tendency to buy past winners seems to
be more prevalent while selling past losers is less prevalent.30
Eduardo Borensztein and R.Gaston Gelos
60
Table 8. Past-Month Performance and Dollar Ratio (DR),
by Fund Type and Market Size
Past-Month-  Single- Large Funds Small Funds Ten Most Ten Least All Funds 
Performance All Country (largest (smallest  Liquid Liquid During
Quintile Funds Funds 20 percent) 20 percent) Markets Markets Crises
1 (Worst) –0.10 –0.35 –0.07 –0.21 0.03 –0.12 –0.10
2 –0.18 –0.43 –0.14 –0.35 0.03 –0.22 –0.14
3 –0.11 –0.30 –0.10 –0.32 0.03 –0.17 –0.14
4 –0.10 –0.38 –0.10 –0.28 0.03 –0.15 –0.07
5 (Best) 0.00 –0.36 –0.01 –0.22 0.02 –0.04 –0.05
Overall
correlation 0.05* 0.02 0.02 0.05* 0.05 0.05 0.01
Sources:Authors’calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance Corporation.
Notes: Crisis periods include 1997:08–1997:12, 1998:06–1998:10, and 1998:11–1999:02, which correspond
to crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively. Correlations marked with an asterisk (*) are significant at the
5 percent level.
29Note that this type of behavior can be as destabilizing as positive-feedback trading.
30Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) find that the propensity to buy past winners and sell past
losers is stronger during non-crisis periods. V. Conclusion
We find statistically significant evidence for herding behavior, but its magnitude is
smaller than what anecdotal evidence might have led one to expect. There are no
dominant patterns across funds and over time, although herding is more prevalent
in larger emerging markets. Herding is less pronounced among closed-end funds,
suggesting that herding behavior might, to a significant extent, be traceable to
individual investors’ behavior. Differences in the degree of herding across coun-
tries are correlated with stock-return volatility. To some extent, emerging market
funds also follow momentum strategies, selling past losers and buying past win-
ners. This behavior is more pronounced when selling than when buying, but not
more prevalent during crises. 
Overall, although we have gathered some circumstantial evidence, the case
against emerging market mutual funds remains to be proven. Herding and positive
feedback trading appear to be relevant phenomena among dedicated emerging
market equity funds. The observed degree of herding and momentum trading,
however, is probably too limited to account for the large observed volatility on
international capital markets. Other considerations clearly play a role in the asset
allocations of these funds; this remains a subject for further research.31
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Table 9. Changes in Portfolio Weights in Response to Lagged Returns
Single- Large Funds Small Funds Ten Most Ten Least All Funds 
All Country (largest (smallest Liquid Liquid During
Funds Funds 20 percent) 20 percent) Markets Markets Crises1
Overall 0.81 3.42 0.30 1.54 0.86 –0.63 1.24
(10.86) (5.41) (4.62) (5.88) (7.08) (–5.57) (8.95)
Buy 0.23 0.11 0.11 0.74 0.37 –0.66 0.50
(3.22) (0.17) (1.53) (2.95) (3.17) (–6.18) (3.69)
Sell 0.34 2.39 –0.08 0.98 0.55 –0.40 0.04
(3.53) (2.86) (–1.06) (2.83) (3.40) (–2.68) (0.22)
Sources:Authors’calculations based on data from eMergingPortfolio.com; and International Finance Corporation.
Notes: The figures show the coefficients from regressions of (wjt–wjt–1) on Ri,t–1and fund fixed effects, where
wjt denotes the portfolio weight of country i at time t and Ri,t–1 stands for the prior-month return in country i. The
results reported in the Buy (Sell) row are those from regressions restricted to observations where (wjt–wjt–1)>0
(<0). The t-statistics are given in parentheses. The R2s of the regressions (not shown) were very low, mostly below
0.01. The coefficients on time dummies are omitted. 
1Periods include 1997:08–1997:12, 1998:06–1998:10, and 1998:11–1999:02, which correspond to crises in
Asia, Russia, and Brazil, respectively.
31Disyatat and Gelos (2001) have recently shown that a model of mean-variance optimization around
a benchmark index helps to explain funds’asset allocations. Fund managers do not seem to be guided by
past returns when assessing expected returns, but historical correlation matrices appear to be good approx-
imations of expected correlations.APPENDIX
Simulating the Herding Measure Distribution
Following Wermers (1999), we use a Monte Carlo simulation procedure to generate a simulated
distribution of herding measures under the null hypothesis of independent trading. For each
month t, the number of funds investing in a given country i in month t is generated as a draw
from a binomial distribution. More precisely, if nit is the number of actual trades in a country
(if nit is greater than or equal to 5), we produce nit draws from a U(0,1) distribution with a ran-
dom number generator. Each draw is rounded up to 1 if it is greater than 1– E[pit] (where E[pit]
is the actual proportion of funds buying in that year, as explained in Section III); otherwise, it
is rounded down to zero. These outcomes are summed up, yielding a draw from a binomial dis-
tribution b(nit, E[pit]). Based on this simulated data, we calculate the simulated herding mea-
sures. We repeat this procedure 100 times, obtaining a sample of 188,200 simulated herding
measures.
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